WORK IN PROGRESS
*Drafts of most papers available upon request
Formal and Methodological Papers
"Pursuing Social Progress: The Question of Orientation"
Collaborative work with Ryan Muldoon and David Wiens that introduces a new framework for thinking about the role that ideals play in orienting the pursuit of social progress. We argue that arguments made using traditional philosophical methods are no longer likely to make substantive contributions to debates on this topic, but that further progress can be made by using computational models. We sketch one such model, show how it provides novel insights, and suggest several ways in which our model can be extended to generate further insights.
“When Are Cycles Meaningful? Political Realignment, Social Choice, and the Trade-off Between Utilizing and Imputing Information“
Explores a tradeoff that collective choice mechanisms face between maximizing the use of available information, on one hand, and excluding irrelevant information, on the other. While the importance of this tradeoff has long been recognized, and has received lots of attention in the form of debates over what the best way to characterize relevant information is, this paper provides an explanation for why the tradeoff arises that casts the problems it poses in a new light. Specifically, I show that we confront the tradeoff between maximizing the use of available information and minimizing the influence of irrelevant information because rules that utilize more information must also make more assumptions about the nature of that information. This means that the problem we face when making collective decisions is not primarily a matter of insulating our decision procedures from real, but irrelevant information. Rather the real problem concerns how we can insulate our decision procedures from imputed information that may be misleading. To illustrate the practical implications of this problem the paper concludes by exploring the phenomenon of cyclical preferences. In particular, it asks when are cycles meaningful? As I show, this question is shaped by the multidimensional nature of politics, and the answer to the question requires us to distinguish between ties and cycles. Roughly, I propose that cycles are distinct from ties when they reflect the possibility for political realignment.
"Four Dimensions of Realism in Normative Political Theory"
Debates about the merits of realism and idealism in political theory have been confused by a tendency to conflate several distinct methodological commitments. This paper introduces four ways of characterizing these commitments – the independence thesis, the Madisonian principle, the contingency thesis, and the practicality thesis – and considers how these distinctions help us compare the methodological approaches and core commitments of several canonical figures in the history of political thought. Briefly, the independence thesis is the claim that political theorizing can and should be done free from prior normative constraints, and that normative political principles cannot be derived from prior principles of moral theory. The Madisonian principle is the claim that political theory should concern itself with the analysis of political actors as they actually are and should be cautious in abstracting away from the features of the world that make social and political institutions necessary, or which determine how they are likely to operate. The contingency thesis is the idea that principles for evaluating political order tend to become less useful as they become more idealized, abstract, or timeless. And the practicality thesis is the belief that the primary aim of political theory is to identify an achievable standard for how social and political institutions should be organized or assessed given realistic expectations about how political actors are likely to behave.
“Does Diversity Trump Ability in the Lab?”
Experimental work in collaboration with Bart Wilson that is trying to translate the Hong-Page model of diversity in lab experiments. Goal of the experiments is to explore whether the “Diversity Trumps Ability” theorem holds up in conditions where agents aren’t myopic and naïve by design. In particular, we’re interested in whether high ability individuals will realize that group search problems are different from individual search problems and whether they will adjust their search strategies accordingly. We’ve run several sessions, and done preliminary data analysis, but need to run more sessions before we can write up results.
Papers (at least partly) on Historical Figures
"The Demigod Within The Breast: Reflections on Ben-Moshe’s (over)-idealization of the moral point of view"
Critical essay that provides substantive criticism of the Adam Smithian account of the "moral point of view" that Nir Ben-Moshe develops in a new book. I agree with Ben-Moshe that Smith's account of the impartial spectator provides an attractive foundation from which to build an account of the moral point of view, but I argue that the account he ultimately develops departs from Smith's view in two important ways, and further that, as a result, Ben-Moshe's account is overly idealized in a way that threatens to undermine its sentimentalist motivations. In making this argument special attention is paid to the relationship between universality and impartiality, and to Smith's characterization of the impartial spectator as a "demigod within the breast."
“Aristotelian Magnanimity and the Demands of Representing a Public”
In book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses a virtue he calls megalopsychia that is associated primarily with the attitudes one takes towards great honors. Alternately translated as magnanimity and ‘greatness of soul’ Aristotle's discussion of this virtue is interesting both for the criticism directed at it in some circles and for the lack of attention it has received in others. Critics of Aristotelian magnanimity have argued that the virtue, and especially Aristotle’s account of it, does not fit nicely within Aristotle’s broader account of the virtues. The trouble with magnanimity stems partly from a number of distinctions Aristotle bestows upon it, as well as from a set of traits he suggests are required of the magnanimous man that that some have found off-putting. Perhaps for this reason, contemporary virtue ethicists have tended to eschew discussion of the virtue all together. Political theorists concerned with statesmanship have devoted more attention to the virtue, but even among them magnanimity has not had many friends, and there are fewer still who argue that Aristotle’s account is of relevance to contemporary politics. Both of these things – the criticism and the lack of attention – are unfortunate. In this paper I argue that magnanimity has a place in Aristotle's ethics, that his discussion of magnanimity does not present the problem that other commentators have thought, and further that his discussion highlights a distinctive deliberative problem that public figures often face which remains relevant today and about which contemporary virtue ethicists have said little.
“A Society for the Individual? Searching for the Core of Classical Liberalism in Hayek and Humboldt”
There are myriad figures who have claimed the mantle of classical liberalism, and identifying a core set of beliefs among these figures is difficult. This paper suggests that a surprising core can be found in the work of Hayek and Humboldt. What makes the core surprising is the extent to which it’s focused on group level benefits. While this might seem to stand in tension with the commitment to methodological individualism often associated with classical liberalism, I argue that this tension isn’t as serious as it first appears.
“Reconsidering the Case for Property-Owning Democracy”
The idea of property-owning democracy first introduced in the 1920's by the British intellectual Noel Skelton has been the subject of recurrent waves of enthusiastic attention (most recently in the early to mid 2010’s). This attention typically stems from the belief that existent welfare states are ineffective, and perhaps unjust, and the periodic attention is interesting because the idea has, at various times, been a darling of both the left and the right (both John Rawls and Margaret Thatcher were vocal advocates). This paper assesses both the philosophical and social scientific cases for property-owning democracy and argues that that the case is not as clear as either its initial proponents or its recent advocates have suggested.
*Drafts of most papers available upon request
Formal and Methodological Papers
"Pursuing Social Progress: The Question of Orientation"
Collaborative work with Ryan Muldoon and David Wiens that introduces a new framework for thinking about the role that ideals play in orienting the pursuit of social progress. We argue that arguments made using traditional philosophical methods are no longer likely to make substantive contributions to debates on this topic, but that further progress can be made by using computational models. We sketch one such model, show how it provides novel insights, and suggest several ways in which our model can be extended to generate further insights.
“When Are Cycles Meaningful? Political Realignment, Social Choice, and the Trade-off Between Utilizing and Imputing Information“
Explores a tradeoff that collective choice mechanisms face between maximizing the use of available information, on one hand, and excluding irrelevant information, on the other. While the importance of this tradeoff has long been recognized, and has received lots of attention in the form of debates over what the best way to characterize relevant information is, this paper provides an explanation for why the tradeoff arises that casts the problems it poses in a new light. Specifically, I show that we confront the tradeoff between maximizing the use of available information and minimizing the influence of irrelevant information because rules that utilize more information must also make more assumptions about the nature of that information. This means that the problem we face when making collective decisions is not primarily a matter of insulating our decision procedures from real, but irrelevant information. Rather the real problem concerns how we can insulate our decision procedures from imputed information that may be misleading. To illustrate the practical implications of this problem the paper concludes by exploring the phenomenon of cyclical preferences. In particular, it asks when are cycles meaningful? As I show, this question is shaped by the multidimensional nature of politics, and the answer to the question requires us to distinguish between ties and cycles. Roughly, I propose that cycles are distinct from ties when they reflect the possibility for political realignment.
"Four Dimensions of Realism in Normative Political Theory"
Debates about the merits of realism and idealism in political theory have been confused by a tendency to conflate several distinct methodological commitments. This paper introduces four ways of characterizing these commitments – the independence thesis, the Madisonian principle, the contingency thesis, and the practicality thesis – and considers how these distinctions help us compare the methodological approaches and core commitments of several canonical figures in the history of political thought. Briefly, the independence thesis is the claim that political theorizing can and should be done free from prior normative constraints, and that normative political principles cannot be derived from prior principles of moral theory. The Madisonian principle is the claim that political theory should concern itself with the analysis of political actors as they actually are and should be cautious in abstracting away from the features of the world that make social and political institutions necessary, or which determine how they are likely to operate. The contingency thesis is the idea that principles for evaluating political order tend to become less useful as they become more idealized, abstract, or timeless. And the practicality thesis is the belief that the primary aim of political theory is to identify an achievable standard for how social and political institutions should be organized or assessed given realistic expectations about how political actors are likely to behave.
“Does Diversity Trump Ability in the Lab?”
Experimental work in collaboration with Bart Wilson that is trying to translate the Hong-Page model of diversity in lab experiments. Goal of the experiments is to explore whether the “Diversity Trumps Ability” theorem holds up in conditions where agents aren’t myopic and naïve by design. In particular, we’re interested in whether high ability individuals will realize that group search problems are different from individual search problems and whether they will adjust their search strategies accordingly. We’ve run several sessions, and done preliminary data analysis, but need to run more sessions before we can write up results.
Papers (at least partly) on Historical Figures
"The Demigod Within The Breast: Reflections on Ben-Moshe’s (over)-idealization of the moral point of view"
Critical essay that provides substantive criticism of the Adam Smithian account of the "moral point of view" that Nir Ben-Moshe develops in a new book. I agree with Ben-Moshe that Smith's account of the impartial spectator provides an attractive foundation from which to build an account of the moral point of view, but I argue that the account he ultimately develops departs from Smith's view in two important ways, and further that, as a result, Ben-Moshe's account is overly idealized in a way that threatens to undermine its sentimentalist motivations. In making this argument special attention is paid to the relationship between universality and impartiality, and to Smith's characterization of the impartial spectator as a "demigod within the breast."
“Aristotelian Magnanimity and the Demands of Representing a Public”
In book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses a virtue he calls megalopsychia that is associated primarily with the attitudes one takes towards great honors. Alternately translated as magnanimity and ‘greatness of soul’ Aristotle's discussion of this virtue is interesting both for the criticism directed at it in some circles and for the lack of attention it has received in others. Critics of Aristotelian magnanimity have argued that the virtue, and especially Aristotle’s account of it, does not fit nicely within Aristotle’s broader account of the virtues. The trouble with magnanimity stems partly from a number of distinctions Aristotle bestows upon it, as well as from a set of traits he suggests are required of the magnanimous man that that some have found off-putting. Perhaps for this reason, contemporary virtue ethicists have tended to eschew discussion of the virtue all together. Political theorists concerned with statesmanship have devoted more attention to the virtue, but even among them magnanimity has not had many friends, and there are fewer still who argue that Aristotle’s account is of relevance to contemporary politics. Both of these things – the criticism and the lack of attention – are unfortunate. In this paper I argue that magnanimity has a place in Aristotle's ethics, that his discussion of magnanimity does not present the problem that other commentators have thought, and further that his discussion highlights a distinctive deliberative problem that public figures often face which remains relevant today and about which contemporary virtue ethicists have said little.
“A Society for the Individual? Searching for the Core of Classical Liberalism in Hayek and Humboldt”
There are myriad figures who have claimed the mantle of classical liberalism, and identifying a core set of beliefs among these figures is difficult. This paper suggests that a surprising core can be found in the work of Hayek and Humboldt. What makes the core surprising is the extent to which it’s focused on group level benefits. While this might seem to stand in tension with the commitment to methodological individualism often associated with classical liberalism, I argue that this tension isn’t as serious as it first appears.
“Reconsidering the Case for Property-Owning Democracy”
The idea of property-owning democracy first introduced in the 1920's by the British intellectual Noel Skelton has been the subject of recurrent waves of enthusiastic attention (most recently in the early to mid 2010’s). This attention typically stems from the belief that existent welfare states are ineffective, and perhaps unjust, and the periodic attention is interesting because the idea has, at various times, been a darling of both the left and the right (both John Rawls and Margaret Thatcher were vocal advocates). This paper assesses both the philosophical and social scientific cases for property-owning democracy and argues that that the case is not as clear as either its initial proponents or its recent advocates have suggested.
