Works in Progress
“Does Diversity Trump Ability in the Lab?”
Experimental work in collaboration with Bart Wilson that is trying to translate the Hong-Page model of diversity in lab experiments. Goal of the experiments is to explore whether the “Diversity Trumps Ability” theorem holds up in conditions where agents aren’t myopic and naïve by design. In particular, we’re interested in whether high ability individuals will realize that group search problems are different from individual search problems and whether they will adjust their search strategies accordingly. We’ve run several sessions, and done preliminary data analysis, but need to run more sessions before we can write up results.
“Aristotelian Magnanimity and the Demands of Representing a Public”
In book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses a virtue he calls megalopsychia that is associated primarily with the attitudes one takes towards great honors. Alternately translated as magnanimity and ‘greatness of soul’ Aristotle's discussion of this virtue is interesting both for the criticism directed at it in some circles and for the lack of attention it has received in others. Critics of Aristotelian magnanimity have argued that the virtue, and especially Aristotle’s account of it, does not fit nicely within Aristotle’s broader account of the virtues. The trouble with magnanimity stems partly from a number of distinctions Aristotle bestows upon it, as well as from a set of traits he suggests are required of the magnanimous man that that some have found off-putting. Perhaps for this reason, contemporary virtue ethicists have tended to eschew discussion of the virtue all together. Political theorists concerned with statesmanship have devoted more attention to the virtue, but even among them magnanimity has not had many friends, and there are fewer still who argue that Aristotle’s account is of relevance to contemporary politics. Both of these things – the criticism and the lack of attention – are unfortunate. In this paper I argue that magnanimity has a place in Aristotle's ethics, that his discussion of magnanimity does not present the problem that other commentators have thought, and further that his discussion highlights a distinctive deliberative problem that public figures often face which remains relevant today and about which contemporary virtue ethicists have said little.
“A Society for the Individual? Searching for the Core of Classical Liberalism in Hayek and Humboldt”
There are myriad figures who have claimed the mantle of classical liberalism, and identifying a core set of beliefs among these figures is difficult. This paper suggests that a surprising core can be found in the work of Hayek and Humboldt. What makes the core surprising is the extent to which it’s focused on group level benefits. While this might seem to stand in tension with the commitment to methodological individualism often associated with classical liberalism, I argue that this tension isn’t as serious as it first appears.
“Who Does Data Really Belong To?”
This paper explores a pair of complementary rights that have been proposed as ways of formally codifying the idea that “our data belongs to us,”: i) the right to retrieve personal information and data collected about ourselves by organizations operating in certain jurisdictions (e.g. the EU), and ii) to transfer information about ourselves from one organization to another in a format that is easy to utilize. There are many things to be said in favor of these rights. However, I argue that the idea that they are (or should be) grounded in the fact that our data belongs to us is problematic for a number of reasons. For one thing adjudicating claims about who data belongs to are complicated by the fact that much of the data that the proposed rights would pertain to would not exist if platforms did not collect it. Among other things this is because much of this data is not so much about us, as about how we interact with various platforms. Second, when the nature of big data is more closely examined, we see that entrenching the idea that individuals have (or should have) extensive rights to data portability may threaten to exacerbate many of the very market dynamics that proponents of this idea have worried about. That is, prioritizing accessibility and portability may come at the cost of concentrating the market power of the entities that create, provide, and maintain the systems architecture that allow data to be collected, stored, shared, and analyzed.
“Reconsidering the Case for Property-Owning Democracy”
The idea of property-owning democracy first introduced in the 1920's by the British intellectual Noel Skelton has been the subject of recurrent waves of enthusiastic attention (most recently in the early to mid 2010’s). This attention typically stems from the belief that existent welfare states are ineffective, and perhaps unjust, and the periodic attention is interesting because the idea has, at various times, been a darling of both the left and the right (both John Rawls and Margaret Thatcher were vocal advocates). This paper assesses both the philosophical and social scientific cases for property-owning democracy and argues that that the case is not as clear as either its initial proponents or its recent advocates have suggested.
“Evaluating the Impact of the Alaska Native Regional Corporations on Native Welfare”
This paper explores the impact that the Alaska Native Regional Corporations have had on the welfare of Alaskan Natives. The ANRCs were created in 1971 following the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act which collectively awarded the existing Alaskan Native population $1 billion and the surface and subsurface rights to approximately 44 million acres in land. In order to manage this endowment, 12 regional corporations (and 200 village corporations) were created, with shares in the corporations assigned to Alaskan Natives currently living in the state according to where in the state they lived. The ANRCs are an interesting subject for two reasons. First, the size of the settlement awarded to the Alaskan Natives and the corporate governance structure they subsequently adopted distinguish Alaskan Natives from other groups of American Indians. Second, the ANRCs provide an interesting test case for the idea of "property-owning democracy" which has been proposed by several economists, philosophers, and political scientists as a potentially attractive alternative (or supplement) to existing welfare policies. One of the ANRCs, in particular, Cook Inlet Regional Inc (CIRI), provides an especially compelling case study as a result of a one-time $65,000 dividend that it paid out to each of its approximately 8,000 shareholders in 2000 following its sale of a large stake in a major telecommunications company.
“In Defense of Moral Luck”
Originally a chapter of my dissertation, this paper is being repurposed to serve as a core chapter in a book I plan to write on moral luck. The paper surveys the literature on moral luck and argues that most attempts at dealing with the problems luck poses for morality are unsatisfying either because they are internally inconsistent or because they paint a picture of morality that is unrecognizable.
“Does Diversity Trump Ability in the Lab?”
Experimental work in collaboration with Bart Wilson that is trying to translate the Hong-Page model of diversity in lab experiments. Goal of the experiments is to explore whether the “Diversity Trumps Ability” theorem holds up in conditions where agents aren’t myopic and naïve by design. In particular, we’re interested in whether high ability individuals will realize that group search problems are different from individual search problems and whether they will adjust their search strategies accordingly. We’ve run several sessions, and done preliminary data analysis, but need to run more sessions before we can write up results.
“Aristotelian Magnanimity and the Demands of Representing a Public”
In book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses a virtue he calls megalopsychia that is associated primarily with the attitudes one takes towards great honors. Alternately translated as magnanimity and ‘greatness of soul’ Aristotle's discussion of this virtue is interesting both for the criticism directed at it in some circles and for the lack of attention it has received in others. Critics of Aristotelian magnanimity have argued that the virtue, and especially Aristotle’s account of it, does not fit nicely within Aristotle’s broader account of the virtues. The trouble with magnanimity stems partly from a number of distinctions Aristotle bestows upon it, as well as from a set of traits he suggests are required of the magnanimous man that that some have found off-putting. Perhaps for this reason, contemporary virtue ethicists have tended to eschew discussion of the virtue all together. Political theorists concerned with statesmanship have devoted more attention to the virtue, but even among them magnanimity has not had many friends, and there are fewer still who argue that Aristotle’s account is of relevance to contemporary politics. Both of these things – the criticism and the lack of attention – are unfortunate. In this paper I argue that magnanimity has a place in Aristotle's ethics, that his discussion of magnanimity does not present the problem that other commentators have thought, and further that his discussion highlights a distinctive deliberative problem that public figures often face which remains relevant today and about which contemporary virtue ethicists have said little.
“A Society for the Individual? Searching for the Core of Classical Liberalism in Hayek and Humboldt”
There are myriad figures who have claimed the mantle of classical liberalism, and identifying a core set of beliefs among these figures is difficult. This paper suggests that a surprising core can be found in the work of Hayek and Humboldt. What makes the core surprising is the extent to which it’s focused on group level benefits. While this might seem to stand in tension with the commitment to methodological individualism often associated with classical liberalism, I argue that this tension isn’t as serious as it first appears.
“Who Does Data Really Belong To?”
This paper explores a pair of complementary rights that have been proposed as ways of formally codifying the idea that “our data belongs to us,”: i) the right to retrieve personal information and data collected about ourselves by organizations operating in certain jurisdictions (e.g. the EU), and ii) to transfer information about ourselves from one organization to another in a format that is easy to utilize. There are many things to be said in favor of these rights. However, I argue that the idea that they are (or should be) grounded in the fact that our data belongs to us is problematic for a number of reasons. For one thing adjudicating claims about who data belongs to are complicated by the fact that much of the data that the proposed rights would pertain to would not exist if platforms did not collect it. Among other things this is because much of this data is not so much about us, as about how we interact with various platforms. Second, when the nature of big data is more closely examined, we see that entrenching the idea that individuals have (or should have) extensive rights to data portability may threaten to exacerbate many of the very market dynamics that proponents of this idea have worried about. That is, prioritizing accessibility and portability may come at the cost of concentrating the market power of the entities that create, provide, and maintain the systems architecture that allow data to be collected, stored, shared, and analyzed.
“Reconsidering the Case for Property-Owning Democracy”
The idea of property-owning democracy first introduced in the 1920's by the British intellectual Noel Skelton has been the subject of recurrent waves of enthusiastic attention (most recently in the early to mid 2010’s). This attention typically stems from the belief that existent welfare states are ineffective, and perhaps unjust, and the periodic attention is interesting because the idea has, at various times, been a darling of both the left and the right (both John Rawls and Margaret Thatcher were vocal advocates). This paper assesses both the philosophical and social scientific cases for property-owning democracy and argues that that the case is not as clear as either its initial proponents or its recent advocates have suggested.
“Evaluating the Impact of the Alaska Native Regional Corporations on Native Welfare”
This paper explores the impact that the Alaska Native Regional Corporations have had on the welfare of Alaskan Natives. The ANRCs were created in 1971 following the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act which collectively awarded the existing Alaskan Native population $1 billion and the surface and subsurface rights to approximately 44 million acres in land. In order to manage this endowment, 12 regional corporations (and 200 village corporations) were created, with shares in the corporations assigned to Alaskan Natives currently living in the state according to where in the state they lived. The ANRCs are an interesting subject for two reasons. First, the size of the settlement awarded to the Alaskan Natives and the corporate governance structure they subsequently adopted distinguish Alaskan Natives from other groups of American Indians. Second, the ANRCs provide an interesting test case for the idea of "property-owning democracy" which has been proposed by several economists, philosophers, and political scientists as a potentially attractive alternative (or supplement) to existing welfare policies. One of the ANRCs, in particular, Cook Inlet Regional Inc (CIRI), provides an especially compelling case study as a result of a one-time $65,000 dividend that it paid out to each of its approximately 8,000 shareholders in 2000 following its sale of a large stake in a major telecommunications company.
“In Defense of Moral Luck”
Originally a chapter of my dissertation, this paper is being repurposed to serve as a core chapter in a book I plan to write on moral luck. The paper surveys the literature on moral luck and argues that most attempts at dealing with the problems luck poses for morality are unsatisfying either because they are internally inconsistent or because they paint a picture of morality that is unrecognizable.